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The "political question" doctrine restricts the range of con-
stitutional issues that the judiciary will decide. According to a
conventional view, issues characterized as political questions
"concern matters as to which departments of government other
than the cQurts, or perhaps the electorate as a whole, must have
the final say. With respect to these matters, the judiciary does
not define constitutional limits."' The United States Supreme
Court set forth the salient characteristics of political questions
in Baker v. Carr.2 These characteristics include:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judi-
cially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy deter-
mination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the im-
possibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
ence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.'
The Supreme Court's discussions of political questions have
aroused considerable debate over the doctrine's scope and valid-
ity. While some commentators have argued that the political
question doctrine flows logically and inherently from the separa-
*Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. A.B. 1976,
Brown University; J.D. 1979, Harvard University. The time devoted to this Article was
made possible by a Faculty Research Award from Florida State University.
1. L. TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 72 (1978).
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3. Id. at 217.
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tion of powers principle,4 others perceive a substantial element
of discretion in the Court's determination of whether a claim
raises a nonjusticiable issue.5 Some even contend that the Su-
preme Court's political question decisions do not present a sin-
gle coherent doctrine at all.'
In a sense, however, controversy over the content and appli-
cation of the Court's formal political question doctrine has sub-
sided in importance if not intensity. The Court's willingness to
decide cases widely regarded as presenting political questions
7
appears to have signaled the formal doctrine's decline as a ra-
tionale for refusal to adjudicate. Indeed, the invocation of the
political question doctrine appears to have nearly fallen into
desuetude; only once in the past two decades has the Court de-
cided that an issue raised a nonjusticiable political question.8
More typically the Court has rejected, with little discussion, at-
tempts to dismiss suits on political question grounds.9
Despite this absence of serious evolution in Supreme Court
opinions, the idea of political questions has not escaped judicial
attention entirely. The supreme courts of the states-the "other
supreme courts" 10-have continued to address the notion of in-
4. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HIv. L. Rav. 1,
7-9, 13-14 (1959); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARv. L. REv. 296 (1925).
5. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 79; Bickel, Foreward: The Passive Virtues, 75 H~Av. L.
REv. 40, 46, 79 (1961); McCloskey, Foreward: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HAxv. L.
REv. 54, 62-64 (1962); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Func-
tional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966); Schwartz and McCormack, The Justiciability
of Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 TEx. L. Rav. 1033
(1968).
6. Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 384, 390 N.E.2d 813, 823-24
(1979)(Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), "put to
shambles any attempts by legal scholars to reconcile the court's pronouncements in this
area."); Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); see
Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HIv. L. Rav. 338, 344 (1924)(referring to
"chaos" in the Supreme Court's determinations of what issues qualify as political
questions).
7. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 5, at 63.
8. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973)(holding nonjusticiable a suit by Kent State
University students seeking injunctive relief against governor and other government offi-
cials to prevent recurrence of events in May 1970 in which the Ohio National Guard
allegedly violated students' constitutional rights); see Scharpf, supra note 5, at 596
(Outside of matters relating to foreign relations, the political question doctrine "has been
restricted to a few, narrowly circumscribed issues of constitutional law.").
9. E.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2778-80
(1983).
10. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme
[Vol. 35
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herently nonjusticiable issues and have formulated their own po-
litical question doctrines. The past decade has witnessed a nota-
ble upsurge of interest in state law as an independent source of
constitutional doctrine.11 It is appropriate, therefore, to examine
the state courts' approach to the political question doctrine, or
stated differently, the threshold question of whether the judici-
ary should pass on the constitutional issue involved in a given
dispute. Such an examination should shed light on the debate
surrounding the meaning and legitimacy of the political question
doctrine. 2 Further, such a review might contribute to the study
of federalism itself by highlighting differences between the fed-
eral and state approaches.
II. DECIDING WHAT CONSTITUTES A POLITICAL QUESTION:
TRENDS AMONG THE STATES
Each state supreme court is influenced by different consti-
tutions, traditions and case law, so it is unsurprising that a uni-
form political question doctrine has not yet developed. Never-
theless, a certain parallelism can be discerned from the
responses courts have made to similar issues and concerns when
finding the problem of political questions apposite and in the
disposition of the problem itself.
Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731 (1982).
11. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HAnv. L. REv. 489 (1977); Falk, Foreward: The State Constitution: A More Than
"Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALn. L. REv. 273 (1973); Linde, First Things First:
Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980); Rees, State
Constitutional Law for Maryland Lawyers: Individual Civil Rights, 7 U. BAIT. L. REv.
299 (1978); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of
the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Note, Of Laboratories and Liberties: State
Court Protection of Political and Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REv. 533 (1976); Note, Project
Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271
(1973).
12. State supreme court rulings under state constitutions have sometimes antici-
pated similar United States Supreme Court federal constitutional decisions. Compare
State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981) (invalidating state legisla-
tive veto) and People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152
(1972)(holding that the death penalty violated the state constitution) with Immigration
and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983)(invalidating "legislative
veto") and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)(holding imposition of death penalty
"cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the eighth amendment).
1984] 407
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A. The Conduct and Results of Elections
State courts have usually resisted requests to intervene in
the election process and to interpret election results. State
courts generally regard the electoral process as "self-monitor-
ing"'13 and presumptively exempt from judicial review. In the
constitutional scheme of separation of powers, "[e]lections are a
function of the political branch of the government, are a matter
of political regulation, and are not per se the subject of judicial
cognizance."
14
State courts have remained aloof from the electoral process
even when asked to enjoin allegedly flawed elections. The Ha-
waii Supreme Court, for example, cited the "inappropriateness
of judicial intrusion into matters which concern the political
branch of government"' 5 in refusing to halt a county election
which the plaintiff contended would be held pursuant to an ille-
gal statutory provision. Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme Court
declined to prohibit an election "at the eleventh hour,"' 6 declar-
ing that " 'an election is essentially the exercise of political
power, and, during its progress, is not subject to judicial control.
This comprehends the whole election, including every step and
proceeding necessary to its completion.' "'7 Also, when the legis-
lature has delegated to a board of elections the authority to de-
termine candidates' qualifications, state courts have refused to
review the board's decisions even when they " 'may be contrary
to law.' ",s
State court deference to the political branches on electoral
matters becomes even more emphatic when such courts face
challenges raised in the election's aftermath. When it is alleged
that a winning candidate has failed to meet a constitutional
qualification for candidacy, such as proper residency, courts
13. The term is from Henkin, supra note 6, at 623.
14. State ex rel. Ford v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 449, 451, 150 N.E.2d 43, 45
(1958)(per curiam).
15. Bulgo v. County of Maui, 50 Hawaii 51, 56, 430 P.2d 321, 325 (1967).
16. Brown v. McDaniel, 244 Ark. 362, 365, 427 S.W.2d 193, 194 (1968).
17. Id. at 366, 427 S.W.2d at 195 (quoting Leslie v. Griffin, 25 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930)).
18. People ex rel. Schlaman v. Electoral Bd., 4 IL 2d 504, 508, 122 N.E.2d 532, 535
(1954)(quoting People ex rel. Murray v. Rose, 211 IM. 249, 251, 71 N.E. 1123, 1123
(1904)); see also State ex rel. Ford v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 449, 150 N.E.2d 43
(1958)(per curiam).
4
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have interpreted the applicable constitutional provisions liter-
ally and categorically: the legislature is the judge of its members'
qualifications. Consequently, the state courts have consistently
refused to adjudicate such disputes, usually leaving them for leg-
islative resolution.19 Several state courts have also held that the
issue of legislators' qualifications presents a political question; 0
for the courts to decide this issue "would constitute an en-
croachment upon the legislature . . . and do violence to . . .
separation of powers." 21 In deciding that contested elections
were not within the jurisdiction of the judiciary branch, one
state supreme court relied, in part, on a provision of the state
constitution delegating to the legislature the power to resolve
questions regarding the election of its members.22
Initially, this judicial refusal to pass on election results
seems unremarkable. Abstention here can be viewed as a logical
application of the political question doctrine as formulated in
Baker v. Carr.23 State courts have explicitly inferred legislative
prerogative from a "textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department, '24 the
impossibility of undertaking independent resolution without ex-
pressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment,25 and the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.26
Yet, state supreme court decisions considering the jus-
ticiability of election results are not necessarily congruent with
the federal political question doctrine. Powell v. McCormack
27
suggests potential divergence between the two approaches. In
Powell, the Supreme Court held that congressional determina-
19. State ex rel. Turner v. Scott, 269 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1978)(per curiam); State ex
rel. Carrington v. Human, 544 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1976); State v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498
(Mo. 1970); Harrington v. Carroll, 428 Pa. 510, 239 A.2d 437 (1968); State ex rel. Schieck
v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 759 (Wyo. 1972).
20. State ex rel. Turner v. Scott, 269 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1978)(per curiam);
State v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Mo. 1970); State ex rel. Schieck v. Hathaway, 493
P.2d 759, 763 (Wyo. 1972).
21. State v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Mo. 1970).
22. Witten v. Sternberg, 475 S.W.2d 496, 497-98 (Ky. 1971).
23. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
24. State v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Mo. 1970); State ex rel. Schieck v.
Hathaway, 493 P.2d 759, 763 (Wyo. 1972).
25. State ex rel. Schieck v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 759, 763 (Wyo. 1972).
26. Id.
27. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
19841
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tions of its members' qualifications are not entirely immune
from judicial scrutiny. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., had been
elected to the House of Representatives from a district in New
York. Although he met the federal constitutional requirements
for age, citizenship, and residency,2" the House refused to seat
him because of certain allegations regarding misappropriation of
public funds and abuse of process in the New York courts. The
Supreme Court granted Powell's request for a declaratory judg-
ment and held that his exclusion was unconstitutional. The
Court also dismissed the House's argument that the dispute in-
volved a "textually demonstrable" blanket commitment to Con-
gress to judge its members' qualifications. The Court concluded
instead that article I, section 529 "is at most a 'textually demon-
strable commitment' to Congress to judge only the qualifications
expressly set forth in the Constitution."30
Technically, the holding in Powell is not inconsistent with
the political question decisions of state courts that referred dis-
putes over legislators' qualifications to their respective legisla-
tures for resolution. Powell was seeking the vindication of his
own right to be seated, rather than the disqualification of the
winning candidate, as the issue has been framed in the state
cases. Also, in theory at least, Powell left Congress with plenary
authority to judge whether its members have met the qualifica-
tions imposed by article I, section 2.31 Finally, the Supreme
Court's decision hinged in substantial part on its interpretation
of the history underlying article I, section 5.32
Still, state courts appear to deviate from Powell's tone in
their attitude toward the scope of justiciability. In Powell, the
Supreme Court summarily rejected the contention that adjudi-
cation of Powell's claim would produce a "potentially embarrass-
ing confrontation" with the House of Representatives: "Our sys-
28. Id. "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age
of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall
not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen." U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 2.
29. "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of
its own Members ..... " U.S. CrNsT. art. I, § 5.
30. 395 U.S. at 548.
31. It is unclear, however, whether the Court would have reviewed a wrongful deter-
mination that Powell was not a bona fide resident of New York.
32. 395 U.S. at 522-48.
410 [Vol. 35
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tern of government requires that federal courts on occasion
interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with con-
struction given the document by another branch. The alleged
conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the
courts' avoiding their constitional responsibility. 3 3 In contrast,
state court responses to suits challenging a legislator's qualifica-
tions are characterized by strong expressions of deference to leg-
islative prerogative and the separation of powers principle. One
court explained the necessity of judicial nonintervention: " 'For
any one of three equal and co-ordinate branches of government
to police or supervise the operations of the others strikes at the
very heart and core of the entire structure.' "14 In exercising sim-
ilar restraint, another court relied upon a section of its state's
constitution which provided that no one "charged with the exer-
cise of powers properly belonging to one of these [executive, leg-
islative and judicial] departments shall exercise any powers
properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this con-
stitution expressly directed or permitted."3 "
Such an explicit separation of powers provision, as well as
the judicial strictness of its interpretation, suggests a distinct-
ness in state constitutional doctrines which extends beyond elec-
tion issues. Many state constitutions, under state supreme court
construction, envision a more rigid compartmentalization of the
three departments of government than does the federal constitu-
tion. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, for example, has ob-
served that "the separation of governmental powers mandated
by the Maine Constitution is much more rigorous than the same
principle as applied to the federal government." 6 Thus, the un-
swerving state court refusal to resolve disputes involving the
electoral process forms part of a larger insistence that each de-
partment not engage in or infringe upon the functions of the
others. Since state constitutions are said to limit rather than
33. Id. at 549.
34. State v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498, 500-01 (Mo. 1970)(quoting 16 AM. JUR. 2D Con-
stitutional Law § 213 (1979)), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); see also State ex rel.
Carrington v. Human, 544 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Mo. 1976).
35. WYo. CONST. § 1, art. 2 (quoted in State ex rel. Schieck v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d
759, 761 (Wyo. 1972)).
36. State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 799 (Me. 1982). See Malone v. Meekins, 650 P.2d
351, 357 (Alaska 1982); State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
1984]
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grant legislative power,37 the sharp demarcations between the
branches tend to produce judicial restraint when the legislative
action in question does not clearly threaten to overstep explicit
constitutional bounds. Conversely, state courts have resisted leg-
islative attempts to vest in the judiciary powers that the courts
perceive as belonging to the executive or legislative branches.38
Thus, in classifying electoral disputes as "political ques-
tions," state courts are not assuming a posture of passive defer-
ence to the political branches. Rather, judicial detachment in
this context represents the state courts' reaffirmation of their
preeminent role as guardian of the strict boundaries that state
constitutions have erected between the branches of government.
Just as Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison39 estab-
lished the power of judicial review by denying the jurisdiction
that Congress had sought to confer upon the Supreme Court, so
the state courts, by declining to judge the validity of elections
and their results, reaffirm judicial power to decide who shall be
the ultimate decider of constitutional issues.
B. The Machinery of Government
The separation of powers concept reflected in state court
decisions involving the election process has also fostered the be-
lief that the machinery of government should regulate itself with
minimal judicial interference. That is, state courts have avoided
dictating to the executive and legislative branches how govern-
ment should be structured and how decisions should be made.
In general, only when a particular governmental act may violate
an express constitutional prohibition is the issue removed from
the ambit of political questions.
The Supreme Court has held that state decisions involving
37. Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 283, 432 A.2d 1351, 1355 (1981); Marks v.
Thompson, 282 N.C. 174, 182, 192 S.E.2d 311, 316-17 (1972); Mitchell v. North Carolina
Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 145, 159 S.E.2d 745, 750 (1968).
38. See, e.g., State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797 (Me. 1982); Konkel v. Common Council,
68 Wis. 2d 574, 229 N.W.2d 606 (1975).
39. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Many commentators believe that Marshall deliber-
ately chose Marbury as a politically appealing vehicle for asserting the power of judicial
review. See M. COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LMERAL 178-80 (1946); C. WARREN, THE SUPRE.m
COURT IN UNrrED STATEs HIsToRY 232, 242-43 (1922); Redlich, The Supreme
Court-1833 Term Foreward: The Constitution-"A Rule for the Government of
Courts, As Well as of the Legislature," 40 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1, 4-5 (1965).
[Vol. 35
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legislative apportionment" and municipal boundaries 41 are sub-
ject to the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protec-
tion.42 While state courts have faithfully followed these rulings,
the following has not been with great alacrity. "[W]e are reluc-
tant to undertake to make an apportionment except where the
legislative body concerned has indicated that it can or will not
perform that task in a lawful manner." 43 State courts have mani-
fested this reluctance by refusing to impose a more stringent
standard than the Supreme Court's minimum federal constitu-
tional requirements. For example, after striking down a plan
that deviated from the fourteenth amendment's requirement of
substantial equality in district populations, 44 the California Su-
preme Court rejected a state constitutional challenge to the re-
sulting reapportionment. 45 The decision followed the court's ear-
lier pronouncement that:
The makeup and apportionment of the Legislature involve pe-
culiarly political questions that are not appropriate for this
court to decide. They are far better entrusted to the collective
political wisdom of the Legislature subject to the power of ini-
tiative and referendum reserved to the people. Our function
... is to assure adherence to the requirements of the equal
protection clause, not to resolve the purely political questions
also inherent in legislative apportionment."
Most challenges to a state government's structure or form,
other than those grounded in equal protection, have met similar
fates. When Cleveland's municipal charter was challenged as vi-
40. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
41. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
42. City of Birmingham v. Community Fire Dist., 336 So. 2d 502 (Ala. 1976); Curtis
v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 3d 942, 501 P.2d 537, 46 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1972); Silver v.
Brown, 63 Cal. 2d 270, 405 P.2d 132, 46 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1965); In re Apportionment of
State Legislature, 376 Mich. 410, 137 N.W.2d 495 (1965); In re Independent School Dist.
No. 381, 213 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. 1973); State ex rel. Lockert v. Crowell, 631 S.W.2d 702
(Tenn. 1982); Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1971); State v. Zimmerman, 22
Wis. 2d 544, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964).
43. Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal. 2d 343, 349, 405 P.2d 857, 861, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 617, 621 (1965); see generally State ex rel. Lockert v. Crowell, 631 S.W.2d 702, 706
(Tenn. 1982)(Apportionment "is primarily a legislative function, and ... the courts
should act only if the legislature fails to act constitutionally after having had a reasona-
ble opportunity to do so.").
44. Silver v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d 270, 405 P.2d 132, 46 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1965).
45. Silver v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d 841, 409 P.2d 689, 48 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966).
46. Silver v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d at 280, 405 P.2d at 139, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
19841 413
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olating the federal constitution's guarantee of a republican form
of government, 47 the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the complaint
and stated: "[A]doption of such a form of government raises a
political question, and not a judicial question, and cannot be
challenged in the courts.
'48
Consistent with this approach to judicial restraint, state
courts have been particularly reluctant to review legislative deci-
sions that are not impermissible in substance but are challenged
as having been reached or enacted in contravention of a consti-
tutionally prescribed process. The New Jersey Supreme Court
declined to pass on a complaint alleging that the manner of a
bill's presentment to the governor violated the state constitu-
tion, holding that such a claim presented a nonjusticiable politi-
cal question. The court based its decision on the New Jersey
Constitution's "textually demonstrable commitment" to the leg-
islature of the presentment question.49 Similarly, the Kansas Su-
preme Court declared nonjusticiable a claim involving the state
requirement that the Kansas Senate hold hearings on a gover-
nor's appointment before refusing to confirm the appointee:
[T]here has been a constitutional commitment to the Kansas
Legislature for each house of the legislature to be the sole
judge of its procedure. For the court to involve itself in deter-
mining the advisability and wisdom of the senate's procedure
would result in the court "expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government."5
Also, even when the Alaska House of Representatives' election
may have been conducted at a technically unauthorized meeting,
the Alaska Supreme Court refused to invalidate the election:
Such a declaration would ... be an unwarranted intrusion
into the business of the House.
... [C]ourts should not attempt to adjudicate "political
questions."
47. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
48. Fuldauer v. City of Cleveland, 32 Ohio St. 2d 114, 119, 290 N.E.2d 546, 550
(1972)(quoting Hile v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 144, 145, 141 N.E. 35, 37 (1923)). The
court relied in part on Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), which
held that claims brought under the guaranty clause were nonjusticiable.
49. Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 282, 432 A.2d 1351, 1354-55 (1981).
50. Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. 784, 814, 539 P.2d 304, 328 (1975).
414 [Vol. 35
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... [I]nvolved here is the element of due respect which the ju-
diciary owes to the independent and coequal legislative branch
of government. One of the primary purposes of our separation
of powers is "to safeguard the independence of each branch of
the government and protect it from domination and interfer-
ence by the others."51
Again, judicial unwillingness to intrude upon the domain of po-
litical questions emerges not as meek deference, but rather as
the judiciary's assertion of its role as the ultimate decider of
constitutional spheres of authority.
C. Deference to the Political Branches' Policymaking
Function
State courts frequently refer to the wisdom or reasonable-
ness of a political branch's action as a "political question."
Under formal doctrine the designation is misapplied; in " 'pure
theory' a political question is one in which the courts forego
their unique and paramount function of judicial review of con-
stitutionality. '52 The judicial imprimatur on the political
branches' latitude in formulating policy, however, does not en-
tail renunciation of judicial review. Instead, state courts in these
instances are simply upholding the principle that they are
"bound to accept decisions by the political branches within their
constitutional authority."53 Nevertheless, state courts have per-
sistently designated a wide variety of governmental matters as
"political questions": the reasonableness of utility rates; 5 the
wisdom of a city charter provision;55 the adequacy of community
banking facilities; 56 the determination of whether a certain pub-
51. Malone v. Meekins, 650 P.2d 351, 356-57 (Alaska 1982). But see Zemprelli v.
Daniels, 496 Pa. 247, 436 A.2d 1165 (1981).
52. Henkin, supra note 6, at 599.
53. Id. at 622; see Scharpf, supra note 5, at 578-83.
54. Georgia Power Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 233 Ga. 558, 563, 212 S.E.2d 628, 631-
32 (1975).
55. Ivancie v. Thornton, 250 Or. 550, 556, 443 P.2d 612, 616 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1018 (1969).
56. First Nat'l Bank v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 361 Mass. 381, 383, 280 N.E.2d
400, 401 (1972); Natick Trust Co. v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 337 Mass. 615, 617,
151 N.E.2d 70, 72 (1958).
1984]
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lic use should be modified or extinguished; 57 a department of
public utilities proceeding for reaching a decision;58 the fitness of
a county board of registrars to remain in office;5 e the manner in
which municipal boundaries are to be extended or revised;60 and
the nonenforcement of statutes.61
While mention of political questions in these contexts might
be ascribed simply to confused or imprecise usage, the pattern
that emerges from within the opinions suggests a more signifi-
cant explanation. In particular, state court decisions invoking
the political question doctrine as a basis for withholding review
in these circumstances often include asseverations of other cir-
cumstances under which the court will exercise review. State
courts have stated that fraud or other similar abuses constitute
an exception to the conventional political question doctrine in-
volving electoral matters.6 2 Similarly, courts that consign the
wisdom or expediency of governmental policy to the political
branches as presenting a political question often take pains to
describe the power of review that continues to reside with the
judiciary.
The impetus for both practices seems apparent: state
courts, in circumscribing judicial power under the rubric of po-
litical questions, wish to send a clear signal that judicial re-
straint does not mean judicial abdication. Since the conventional
political question doctrine represents a limited exception to the
normal presumption of justiciability of constitutional issues,
63
state courts may intend to restrict the potential expansiveness of
nonjusticiability by employing this more general usage of "polit-
57. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 260-61, 419 P.2d 374, 381, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790,
797 (1971).
58. Town of Carlisle v. Department of Pub. Util., 353 Mass. 722, 724, 234 N.E.2d
752, 754 (1968).
59. Smith v. Walker, 215 Ga. 385, 386, 110 S.E.2d 640, 641 (1959).
60. School Bd. of Marshall v. State, 162 Tex. 9, 11, 343 S.W.2d 247, 248-49 (1961).
61. Benson Realty Corp. v. Beame, 50 N.Y.2d 994, 996, 409 N.E.2d 948, 949, 431
N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (1980). Cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
62. People ex rel. Schlaman v. Electoral Bd., 4 Ml. 2d 504, 509, 122 N.E.2d 532, 535
(1954); State ex rel. Ford v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 449, 450-51, 150 N.E.2d 43,
45 (1958)(per curiam); see Akizaki v. Fong, 51 Hawaii 354, 358, 461 P.2d 221, 224 (1969);
Wallace v. Cash, 328 S.W.2d 516, 518-19 (Ky. 1959); School Bd. of Marshall v. State, 162
Tex. 9, 10, 343 S.W.2d 247, 248 (1961).
63. "As delineated in Baker fv. Carr], this limitation on judicial power [the political
question doctrine] is a narrow one." State ex rel. Meshel v. Keip, 66 Ohio St. 2d 379, 384,
423 N.E.2d 60, 64 (1981).
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ical questions" with qualifications as to its scope. Thus, by
couching deference to the political branches' policymaking func-
tions as political questions, state courts paradoxically may be
preserving their power to resolve such disputes and order reme-
dies when the occasion warrants.
State court treatment of municipal annexations illustrates
the sharp dichotomy between essentially nonconstitutional polit-
ical questions and the assertion of judicial review over certain
disputes connected with these questions. State courts have held
that the merits of a proposed annexation are a political ques-
tion. 4 One court found "[a] mere citation of the many cases
stating that the wisdom or expediency of particular annexations
is not a judicial question" sufficient to dismiss a challenge to an
annexation.6 5 Nevertheless, these same courts have not hesitated
to review and overturn boundary commission decisions even
when the claim did not raise equal protection or due process
challenges. 6 The Alaska Supreme Court, for example, held that
the question of whether the defendant boundary commission
had properly developed standards and procedures before com-
mencing annexation proceedings was "readily decided by tradi-
tional judicial techniques. '6 7 Also, the Michigan Supreme Court,
while conceding that the judiciary could not evaluate the desira-
bility of any given annexation, still remanded an annexation pe-
tition to the Michigan State Boundary Commission after deter-
mining that the commission had misunderstood its options for
dealing with the petitioner.6 8
Characterizing the wisdom of governmental action as
presenting a political question so as to underscore the authority
still reserved to the judiciary has been even more conspicuous in
the area of takings. State courts have repeatedly described the
64. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v. Local Boundary Comm'n, 489
P.2d 140, 143 (Alaska 1971); People ex rel. Averna v. City of Palm Springs, 51 Cal. 2d 38,
45-46, 331 P.2d 4, 8 (1958); Township of Midland v. Michigan State Boundary Comm'n,
401 Mich. 641, 673, 259 N.W.2d 326, 342 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 1004 (1978);
Texfi Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 7, 269 S.E.2d 142, 147 (1980).
65. People ex rel. Averna v. City of Palm Springs, 51 Cal. 2d 38, 45, 331 P.2d 4, 8
(1958).
66. See infra notes 74-86.
67. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v. Local Boundary Comm'n, 489
P.2d 140, 143 (Alaska 1971).
68. Township of Midland v. Michigan State Boundary Comm'n, 401 Mich. 641, 674,
682, 259 N.W.2d 326, 342, 344 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 1004 (1978).
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necessity or expediency of eminent domain under state law as a
political question not subject to judicial scrutiny.6 9 These same
state courts, however, have adopted an approach similar to the
federal courts' approach in construing the federal constitution's
taking clause:70 the question of "public" use is subject to judicial
determination. 1 "[Wihether or not land is being taken for a
public use is a judicial question regardless of any legislative dec-
laration that the use is public. ' 72 Nor have these courts confined
their inquiry to the category of the proposed use; they have also
asserted authority to invalidate takings made in "bad faith" or
amounting to an "abuse of discretion. ' 73 Once again, this refer-
ence to a zone of political questions beyond judicial resolution
does not accentuate the limits of judicial power. Instead, this
reference merely highlights that zone's sharp judicially imposed
demarcations and the courts' retention of the right to enforce
those demarcations.
D. Rejecting an Enlarged Sphere of Political Questions:
Individual Rights and Public Necessity
State courts uniformly ignore the political question doctrine
in certain categories of controversial cases. This tendency dem-
onstrates that the state courts' frequent invocation of the politi-
cal question doctrine in other situations does not reflect exces-
69. In re Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 314 A.2d 800, 803 (Me. 1974); State ex rel.
State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 359 Mo. 402, 409-10, 222 S.W.2d 64, 68 (1949); Board
of Regents for Northeast Missouri State Teachers College v. Palmer, 356 Mo. 946, 951,
204 S.W.2d 291, 294 (1947); Oakes Mun. Airport Auth. v. Wiese, 265 N.W.2d 697, 699-
700 (N.D. 1978); Thormyer v. Irvin, 170 Ohio St. 276, 278, 164 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1960);
Sargent v. City of Cincinnati, 110 Ohio St. 444, 451, 144 N.E. 132, 134 (1924); Bountiful
v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1975).
70. Schoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1983)(construing U.S. CONST.
amend. V).
71. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 359 Mo. 402, 411, 222 S.W.2d 64,
68 (1949); Board of Regents for Northeast Missouri State Teachers College v. Palmer,
356 Mo. 946, 951, 204 S.W.2d 291, 294 (1947), Thormyr v. Irvin, 170 Ohio St. 276, 279,
164 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1960); Emery v. City of Toledo, 121 Ohio St. 257, 264, 167 N.E. 889,
891-92 (1929).
72. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 359 Mo. 402, 409, 222 S.W.2d
64, 68 (1949)(condemnations).
73. Oakes Mun. Airport Auth. v. Wiese, 265 N.W.2d 697, 700 (N.D. 1978); Thormyer
v. Irvin, 170 Ohio St. 276, 279, 164 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1960); Emery v. City of Toledo, 121
Ohio St. 257, 264, 167 N.E. 889, 891-92 (1929); Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236, 1238
(Utah 1975).
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sive judicial modesty. State courts emphatically resist claims of
nonjusticiability in cases involving individual rights or the judi-
cially perceived public need for intervention. In both situations,
state courts do not hesitate to reject arguments that judicial res-
olution of the dispute would invade the province of a political
branch of government.
1. Individual Rights
As discussed previously,7 4 claims alleging that an apportion-
ment scheme violates the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of
equal protection are exempt from the normal judicial reluctance
to review governmental structure. The rationale for this excep-
tion is that courts perform a special role in enforcing individual
rights such as equal protection.75 Accordingly, state courts have
entertained equal protection challenges to the apportionment of
both state resources and legislatures, notwithstanding the argu-
ment that such challenges pose nonjusticiable political ques-
tions.7 6 The Wyoming Supreme Court, for example, emphatical-
ly upheld the judiciary's role to determine whether that state's
system of financing public education violated the state equal
protection clause:
This [issue of whether the state's system violates the state
equal protection clause] is no more a political question than
any other challenge to the constitutionality of statutes. Declar-
ing the validity of statutes in relation to the constitution is a
power vested in the courts as one of the checks and balances
contemplated by the division of government into three
departments .... 77
74. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
75. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); TRIBE,
supra note 1, at 1000; Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77
MICH. L. REv. 981, 1039-40 (1979).
76. McKenney v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 304, 319 n.5, 412 A.2d 1041, 1048 n.5 (1980)(courts
may review apportionment of state tax proceeds for compliance with state equal protec-
tion standards); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813, 823-24
(1979)(state's public education financing system subject to review under state equal pro-
tection clause); Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 317-
18 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); see Board of Educ., v. Nyquist, 94
Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S. 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90
Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
77. Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 318 (Wyo.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
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Equal protection is not the only right that state courts will
protect even when the challenge implicates the form or internal
operation of government. In Ivancie v. Thornton,78 the Oregon
Supreme Court held that while the wisdom of a city charter pro-
vision governing eligibility for office was a political question, the
court would nevertheless review the provision for compliance
with first amendment standards.9 In Sweeney v. Tucker,80 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the procedural due pro-
cess claim of a legislator expelled from the Pennsylvania House
of Representatives. The court rejected the House's argument
that expulsion of a member pursuant to the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution was "a matter which has been exclusively committed to
the House by the Pennsylvania Constitution and is not subject
to judicial review";81 rather, the court stated that "the determi-
nation of the requirements of procedural due process is undenia-
bly within the judicial power vested in the Pennsylvania judici-
ary" by Pennsylvania's Constitution.8 2 The political question
doctrine, declared the court, "is disfavored when a claim is made
that individual liberties have been infringed.
'8 3
Even in the electoral arena, state court concern for protect-
ing individual rights has outweighed arguments to dismiss based
on the political question doctrine. When a candidate for the
Iowa House of Representatives challenged denial of his seat pri-
marily on equal protection grounds, the Iowa Supreme Court as-
serted that "Iowa courts have power to adjudicate substantial
claims of deprivation of federal or Iowa constitutional rights by
the houses of the Iowa General Assembly in the exercise of the
houses' election contest powers."" With respect to the political
question argument, the court observed that "the trend is away
from the former completely hands-off doctrine when the charge
is that a legislative body substantially violated a constitutional
guarantee while exercising an express constitutional power.""5 In
contrast, the same court held that a challenge to a state sena-
78. 250 Or. 550, 443 P.2d 612 (1968).
79. Id. at 557-59, 443 P.2d at 616-17.
80. 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977).
81. Id. at 506-07, 375 A.2d at 704.
82. Id. at 517, 375 A.2d at 709.
83. Id., 375 A2d at 709.
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tor's qualifications presented a nonjusticiable political question
because the case did not involve "a claim that anyone's personal
constitutional rights are being 'chilled' or infringed upon."86
2. Public Necessity
While some commentators believe that courts often decide
that an issue is nonjusticiable solely because of its "sheer mo-
mentousness, ' 87 sometimes the opposite is true. That is, a court
may become involved in a normally sensitive area because the
court views itself as the only avenue for immediate resolution of
an important public issue. Some commentators have asserted
that the main impetus for Baker v. Carr was that malapportion-
ment is inherently not susceptible to resolution through the nor-
mal political processes.88
State courts have on occasion acknowledged that public ne-
cessity plays a role in the decision of whether to adjudicate a
dispute. In Baker v. Democratic State Central Committee,89 the
Louisiana Supreme Court put aside objections based on the po-
litical question doctrine and the plaintiffs standing to settle the
validity of a Louisiana Democratic State Central Committee res-
olution regarding the qualifications for the party's primary elec-
tion. The court stated that "exigencies" of the case demanded
adjudication of the issue."
In Dudley v. Kerwick,91 the New York Court of Appeals
considered a challenge to a town assessor's broad grant of tax
exemptions to members of a particular church despite political
question concerns. 2 The court rejected the argument that the
nonchurch members' complaint raised a nonjusticiable political
question, citing grounds similar to those in Baker v. Carr9 3 to
justify adjudication of the dispute:
86. State ex rel. Turner v. Scott, 269 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 1978)(per curiam).
87. A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962); Finkelstein, supra note 6,
at 344-45, 363; see Scharpf, supra note 5, at 396-97.
88. See Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Re-
publican Government, 50 CALiF. LAW. REv. 245, 252-54 (1963); Pollak, Judicial Power
and "The Politics of the People," 72 YALE L.J. 81, 88 (1962).
89. 262 La. 1033, 266 So. 2d 199 (1972).
90. Id. at 1050, 266 So. 2d at 205.
91. 52 N.Y.2d 542, 421 N.E.2d 797, 439 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1981).
92. Id. at 552, 421 N.E.2d at 800, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
93. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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There is little likelihood that the populace of the Town of Har-
denburgh will exercise the ballot to remove [the present as-
sessor]. In this town, if the petitioners are to be believed, the
only assessor likely to be removed is not the one who acts to
create the injustice, but instead one who terminates it.'
It is the responsibility of the judiciary, the court held, not to
tolerate this type of "tyranny of the majority." 95
III. POLITICAL QUESTIONS, FEDERALISM, AND JUDICIAL STRATEGY
As indicated previously, the implications of the state court
treatment of political questions extend beyond specific doctrinal
content. With respect to federalism, state courts refusal to slav-
ishly parrot the federal judiciary's conception of political ques-
tions demonstrates that the states can indeed function as an in-
dependent source of constitutional doctrine. These decisions
suggest how judges may employ ideas, such as the political ques-
tion doctrine, as a tool for asserting or preserving judicial
autonomy.
Also, the willingness of state courts to develop their own po-
litical question doctrine supports federalism's theory of the
states as laboratories for experimentation in judicial and legisla-
tive matters. Judicial attitudes toward issues involving elections
or the internal operation of government, for example, may offer
an alternative vision to federal activism. That is, the heightened
readiness of state supreme courts to assign these kinds of issues
to the political branches implies that state courts believe the po-
litical process can be trusted without the need for judicial inter-
vention.06 Thus, to proponents of judicial restraint who argue
that the Supreme Court has sometimes too lightly overridden
concerns about limitations on justiciablity, 97 these state court
opinions provide authority for a more modest view of judicial
power.
More important than the relative merits of the state and
94. 52 N.Y.2d at 551, 421 N.E.2d at 800, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
95. Id., 421 N.E.2d at 800, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
96. The absence of state court decisions striking down malapportionment prior to
Baker v. Carr tends to support this theory.
97. See Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. Rav. 1,
21-22, 52-54 (1978); McCloskey, supra note 5, at 70; Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudi-
cation: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1393 (1973).
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federal political question doctrines, however, is the presence of
doctrinal pluralism. State court independence produces a diver-
sity of outlook that makes possible a testing of ideas and stan-
dards. Such testing would not exist under a regime of monolithic
acceptance of Supreme Court pronouncements on similar or
analogous federal issues. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts has declared: "[W]e have never explicitly incorpo-
rated the Federal doctrine [of political questions] into our State
jurisprudence. We decline to avoid deciding the issue before us
by applying the conclusory label that it is a 'political ques-
tion.' "s98 In that instance, the Supreme Judicial Court proposed
a more contracted version of the federal political question doc-
trine. Nevertheless, the essential point is that the court per-
formed its own analysis of the problem, thus contributing to the
ongoing diversity and occasional debate9 that prevents judicial
doctrine from lapsing into intellectual complacency and rigidity.
In contrast, state courts often rely upon the political ques-
tions' special position in United States Supreme Court jurispru-
dence when invoking the doctrine as a means of protecting judi-
cial review. In this manner, state courts subtly underscore the
exceptional nature of a particular issue by referring to the legis-
lative and executive branches' normal policy choices as "political
questions." In other words, by placing certain carefully defined
issues into the presumably narrow category of political ques-
tions, state courts create precedents for the exercise of judicial
power in other more important categories. This approach rein-
forces both the limitations on the spectrum of nonjusticiable is-
sues and the judiciary's ultimate authority to define that
spectrum.
98. Backman v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 549, 554, 441 N.E.2d 523, 527 (1982); see
also Brennan, supra note 11, at 501 ("[S]tate courts that rest their decisions wholly or
even partly on state law need not apply federal principles of standing and justiciability
that deny litigants access to the courts.").
99. That is, divergent approaches under a federal constitutional provision and its
state counterpart often accompany a debate over which is the superior approach. Where
the issue involves solely the federal constitution, state judicial interpretation must, of
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